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SUMMARY 
Despite extensive research, there is still controversy on the effects of income inequality on 
economic growth. The literature proposes several transmission channels through which these 
effects may take place, and even the existence of two different forms of inequality. However, 
empirical studies have generally not distinguished between these channels, nor have their analyses 
included a consideration of the two forms of inequality and their separate effects on growth. In this 
paper we review the theory and the evidence on the different transmission channels through which 
inequality influences growth. We contribute to the literature by using a system of recursive 
equations, following a control function approach, to empirically assess the relevance of these 
channels and to differentiate between two forms of inequality. In this way we have captured in a 
single model not only a negative effect, but also a positive effect of inequality on long-run economic 
growth. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been said about the effects of income inequality on economic growth. The on-going debate 
rotates around possible negative as well as positive effects of inequality on growth, characterized to work 
through different transmission channels, and considering the complex nature of both phenomena. One 
factor seems to be of major relevance; whether inequality is due to available opportunities and particular 
socio-economic and institutional contexts, or due to market dynamics and unequal outcomes - and uneven 
success. The World Development Report 2006 (World Bank 2006) differentiates between equality of 
opportunities and equality of outcomes. While unequal opportunities are detrimental for development, unequal 
outcomes generate necessary incentives for capital accumulation, innovation and economic growth; 
“inequality of opportunity is wasteful and inimical to sustainable development and poverty reduction” but 
there is an “important role of income differences in providing incentives to invest in education and physical 
capital, to work hard, and to take risks (WDR 2006).” Similarly to the WDR 2006, Easterly (2007) refers to 
structural inequality - due to socio-institutional factors - and to market inequality - due to market forces. While 
the former relates to inefficient institutions, low human capital investment and underdevelopment, the latter 
relates to uneven success in free markets. More recently, Marrero and Rodriguez (2013) follow the same 
argument: they refer to income inequality as a composite measure of inequality of opportunity and inequality 
of effort, which may affect growth through opposite channels. In any case, structural inequality (or inequality 
of opportunity) is expected to have a negative effect on subsequent economic growth, while market inequality 
(or inequality of effort) is expected to have a positive effect.  
The complex influence of inequality on the dynamics of economic growth has again attracted 
attention of the scientific community after the world financial and economic crisis of 2008. Several authors 
have placed a strengthened emphasis on the role of inequalities in the growth process of the last decades, 
but also on the role of the dramatic rise of these inequalities in many countries as a cause of the crisis itself 
(Krugman 2008; Stiglitz 2009; Brescia 2010; Rajan 2010). According to these authors, currently high levels 
of inequality help to explain evident deficiencies in terms of economic performance, which have 
accumulated over the long run. 
 In this paper we conflate the literature on the different transmission channels for inequality to have 
an effect on growth, and the idea of two different components of inequality. By using several variables - 
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that we relate to the different transmission channels - we decompose the variance of inequality using a 
system of recursive equations by means of the Control Function Approach (CFA). Our aim and 
contribution is to provide empirical evidence on the two opposing relationships between inequality and 
long-run economic growth whilst highlighting the relevance of the different transmission channels through 
which inequality operates. Our first main finding is that inequality indeed influences long-run economic 
growth both positively and negatively. Secondly, we argue that the negative influence accounts for roughly 
80 per cent of the total effect in the sample of 51 countries analysed. Interestingly enough, we have identified 
the proportion of mountainous land as a powerful geographical determinant of inequality levels across 
countries, which, to the best of our knowledge, had not been considered before in the literature on 
inequality. Finally, we found that the role that each channel plays may depend critically on the circumstances 
of each country, with the negative influence of inequality being significant in developing countries. These 
results are crucially important for policy makers, as their challenge is to find out how, and not just if, 
inequality is affecting the process of economic growth.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the empirical evidence 
on the effects of income inequality on economic growth, and also the theory and evidence on the different 
transmission channels through which these effects occur. Section III sets out our model and empirical 
strategy. Section IV presents the database. Section V displays the main results. Section VI performs several 
robustness checks. Finally, section VII concludes. 
 
2. THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF INEQUALITY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The traditional econometric approach to assessing the overall impact of inequality on growth has introduced 
a single measure of income distribution in an economic growth model.1 Along these lines, there is seemingly 
conflicting evidence in the literature. On the one hand, several authors support the idea of a negative effect 
of inequality on long-run growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Clarke 1995; Perotti 
                                                          
1 The most used measures are the Gini coefficients and the Theil indices. Some authors have also worked with different shares and 
ratios of the percentiles along the whole distribution of income. On one side, the percentage of the third quartile has been of 
particular interest to capture the weight of the middle class, on the basis that having a strong middle class boosts economic 
development (Easterly 2001; Partridge 2005). On the other side, the use of different percentile ratios allows for a focus on 
differentiated effects depending on the specific distributional forms of income (Voitchovsky 2005). 
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1994, 1996; and Easterly 2007, among others). These results are based on cross-section analyses, an 
approach that, to the best of our knowledge, has never provided evidence of a positive effect. On the other 
hand, other authors have found a positive impact of inequality (Forbes 2000; Barro 2000; Chen 2003 and 
Voitchovsky 2005, among others). However, this positive impact relies on panel data analysis and is either 
associated with short-term economic growth (Forbes 2000) or is dependent on countries’ income (Barro 
2000), on the initial income distribution itself (Chen 2003), on the profile of inequality (Voitchovsky 2005), 
or on the process of urbanization (Castells-Quintana and Royuela 2014). The main argument for using panel 
techniques is that they allow controlling for omitted time-invariant factors and addressing how a change in 
a country’s level of inequality will affect growth within that country (Forbes 2000). When using fixed effects, 
however, if the underlying causal factors in the growth process are persistent, the long-run cross-sectional 
effects will be subsumed into the fixed effects (Fallah and Partridge 2007). Indeed, as Forbes (2000) 
highlights, it is interesting to identify the time-invariant variables, omitted in panel analysis and that could 
generate the negative bias in the inequality coefficient in cross-country growth regressions, as well as to 
evaluate the different channels through which inequality, growth, and any other variables are related. 
Removing time-invariant factors, which, as we will see, are precisely those to which the negative effect of 
inequality is related, limits the possibility of empirically assessing the role of the different mechanisms behind 
the impact of inequality on growth.2  
The literature provides theoretical justifications for both a potential beneficial and a potential 
adverse effect of inequality on the process of economic growth. 3  In particular, while classical and 
neoclassical approaches have underlined a beneficial effect of inequality on growth, modern perspectives 
highlight potential adverse effects of inequality (Galor 2009). However, some approaches predict both a 
potential positive or negative effect.4  
                                                          
2 On a similar line, Davis and Hopkins (2011) have recently argued that panel techniques are not very informative about the 
relationship between inequality and long-run economic growth.  
3 Ferreira (1999) presents “a brief overview to theories of growth and distribution”, including a review of three mechanisms that 
give rise to an effect of distribution on growth; political economy channels, capital market imperfections and social conflict channels. 
More recently, Ehrhart (2009) and Galor (2009) also present a short, though exhaustive and comprehensive overview of the theories 
and empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality and economic development. Neves and Silva (2013) provide a critical 
survey of the empirical literature trying to explain the sources of conflicting results. 
4 Barro (2000) provides a good understanding of how some approaches predict at the same time a negative and a positive effect on 
growth. As Barro notes, even under the socio-political instability approach, lower inequality may not lead to higher growth. If 
economic resources are required for the poor to effectively threaten the socio-political stability, then income-equalizing transfers 
promote stability only to the extent that that they do not encourage the poor to involve in disruptive actions rather than work. 
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On main mechanism for inequality to influence long-run economic growth is through institutions; 
(structural) inequality reinforces bad institutions, low human capital investment and therefore 
underdevelopment (Engermann and Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff and Engermann 2000; Bourguignon and 
Verdier 2000; Acemoglu 2005; Easterly 2007). Factor endowments, according to this mechanism, are a 
central determinant of (structural) inequality and can be used to assess the causal inequality and development 
relationship (Easterly 2007). 
It has also been argued that inequality affects growth due to increased socio-political instability and 
the risk of (violent) conflict, which translates into uncertainty of property rights and reduces investment 
(Alesina and Perotti 1996). Additionally, stability-threatening activities represent an unproductive waste of 
resources and reduce the overall productivity of an economy (Barro 2000).  
Two more approaches highlight a potential negative effect of inequality. The domestic market size 
approach emphasizes the relevance of the middle class and the risks of lower aggregate demand, derived 
from a higher proportion of population with lower purchasing power and the fact that lower income groups 
tend to have higher propensity to demand local products (Murphy et al. 1989; Todaro 1997).  
The endogenous fertility approach highlights the link between higher inequality and higher fertility 
rates, which in turn reduce growth. In particular, this happens given that as the number of children per 
family increases, the average investment in education decreases (Barro 2000; Ehrhart 2009).  
By contrast to the above-discussed mechanisms, according to classical and neoclassical theories an 
increase in inequality leads to higher aggregate savings, as there is greater propensity to save among the rich. 
Higher aggregate saving leads to higher levels of investment and growth (Kaldor 1956), this effect being 
lower the more open the economy is.   
 Finally, another two approaches have mixed predictions about the net effect of inequality. 
According to the political economy approach, either high inequality leads to higher redistributive pressure, 
which in turn may lead to economic distortions and disincentives (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini 1994), or leads the rich to lobby to prevent efficient redistribution policies (e.g. public education) 
from being implemented (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008).5 These lobbying 
                                                          
5 Saint Paul and Verdier (1996) challenge the conventional political economy approach and argue that in fact unequal societies 
redistribute less and that this in turn is detrimental to growth. More recently, Woo (2011) has suggested a fiscal volatility channel 
for inequality to negatively influence growth. 
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activities represent a waste of resources related to rent seeking and corruption and precisely characterize 
what several authors have highlighted as the fundamental adverse role of inequality in the current global 
crisis (Stiglitz 2009; Krugman 2012).  
According to the credit-market imperfections approach, credit constrains reduce the capacity of 
many individuals to invest. This not only increases macroeconomic volatility (Aghion et al. 1999), it also 
reduces average investment - especially in human capital (Galor and Zeira 1993). Both aspects reduce long-
run growth. However, under large set-up costs or investment indivisibilities higher inequality can allow some 
individuals to reach the necessary wealth to invest, leading to greater aggregate investment (Aghion et al. 
1999).  
 The above transmission channels have all been extensively described in the related literature. 
Nevertheless, given data constraints and the difficult task of separately measuring each channel, few studies 
have attempted to empirically and independently assess each of the transmission channels. Indeed, despite 
extensive evidence on the overall impact of inequality on growth, a comprehensive empirical analysis and 
joint examination of the several transmission channels is still missing in the literature. Those studies that 
have tried to analyse the dynamics of the transmissions channels have usually focused on a single theoretical 
approach. The aim of these studies is to first see the relationship between inequality and a given variable, as 
a proxy for the channel under analysis, to then see the effect of this variable on growth (or variables that we 
know are relevant for growth, like investment). Appendix A lists the main papers providing empirical 
evidence for the different channels, the variables they use as proxy for the channel, and the effect they find 
either on growth or investment.  
Seminal works are Perotti (1994, 1996), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996). 
While the latter provides evidence on the negative role of socio-political instability (using several variables 
for social unrest), Perotti (1994) tests two other approaches, namely the capital-market imperfections 
approach, using loan-to-value payment for mortgages as variable, and the political economy approach, using 
the share of government transfers in GDP as a proxy for redistribution. However, none of these papers 
considers the different channels in a single model. In a similar fashion to Alesina and Perotti, later studies 
have focused on liberties, institutions and the quality of property rights as the main transmission channel 
within the socio-political instability approach (Svensson 1998; Keefer and Knack 2002). Concerning the 
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role of the domestic market, on the one hand Falkinger and Zweimüller (1997) consider product diversity, 
while on the other hand Keefer and Knack (2002) consider variables related to population, aggregate GDP 
and openness. In both, results are not conclusively supportive of the domestic-market approach. However, 
Davis (2008) has revalidated the relevance of scale effects, particularly in developing countries, and several 
other authors have provided evidence of the relevance of the size of the middle class (Easterly 2001; 
Partridge 2005). Regarding the endogenous fertility approach, several studies provide evidence on the 
positive link between inequality and fertility rates (Perotti 1996; Koo and Dennis 1999; Kremer and Chen 
2002) and a negative effect of fertility rates on growth (Barro 2000).6 Persson and Tabellini (1994) focused 
on the political economy approach, by considering welfare transfers on a small sample of 13 OECD 
countries for which data were available, to find non-significant results about the prediction that inequality 
increases redistribution, and that redistribution reduces growth. In fact, as noted before, other authors 
support a different relationship between inequalities and redistributive polices. Easterly (2007) tests the 
institutional mechanism. Using geographical variables, in particular the exogenous suitability of land for 
wheat versus sugarcane - as proxy for factor endowment differentials across countries - and the proportion 
of population in tropical areas, he confirms a negative effect of inequality on long-run development. 
Finally, although there is evidence of a growth-enhancing effect expected to be related to incentives 
for capital accumulation (Galor 2009) and for innovation, to incentives to work hard and take risks (World 
Bank 2006), and to agglomeration economies (Fallah and Partridge 2007; Castells-Quintana and Royuela 
2014), we have not found in any paper any explicit assessment of the transmission channels related to this 
positive effect.  
 Unifying the classical and modern perspectives, Galor and Moav (2004) suggest a changing 
relationship between inequality and growth depending on the process of development. Inequality is growth 
enhancing in early stages of development, adverse afterwards in that process, and irrelevant in developed 
economies.7 Papers such as Barro (2000), Chen (2003), Voitchovsky (2005), and Castells-Quintana and 
                                                          
6 Yet, even controlling for fertility, Barro finds a negative effect of inequality in poor countries and a positive effect in rich countries.  
7 In particular, in early stages of development, when physical capital accumulation is the prime engine for growth, inequality can 
enhance the process of development by channelling resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher, 
allowing for higher levels of investment. In later stages of development, however, when human capital accumulation becomes the 
prime engine for growth, and given credit constraints, higher inequality leads to a lower spread of education among individuals, 
handicapping the process of development due to diminishing returns of human capital. Finally, as capital markets develop and credit 
constrains are relaxed, inequality becomes irrelevant. 
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Royuela (2014) provide evidence that inequality can have both negative and positive effects on economic 
growth, depending on the circumstances of the country. Nevertheless, in these papers the two opposing 
effects are not empirically related to any of the different channels through which inequality might affect 
growth, neither is there evidence of both effects happening simultaneously.8  
Summing up, although theoretically the relationship between inequality and growth works through 
different channels, with inequality potentially having at the same time a positive and a negative effect on 
economic growth, empirical evidence in this sense is still scarce. To the best of our knowledge, only Marrero 
and Rodriguez (2013), using U.S. states panel data, find opposing effects for two components of inequality. 
However, they do not consider empirically the different channels through which inequality affects growth. 
We contribute to the literature by providing further evidence of these two different components of 
inequality having opposing effects on a single model of long-run economic growth, considering the multiple 
transmission channels and using cross-country, rather than state-level, data.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Because the focus is on the long-run effects of income inequality, we followed the literature on the 
determinants of cross-country differences on long-run economic growth. This literature tends to rely on 
OLS “Barro regressions”, using a cross-section data of growth rates and initial values of the explanatory 
variables. Results are interpreted as measuring the long-run effects of those variables. In the empirical 
literature on the effects of inequality on economic growth, the majority of cross sectional studies has found 
a negative coefficient (Dominicis et al. 2008). However, Binder and Georgiadis (2011) list up to four basic 
problems associated with these regressions: all cross country heterogeneities are assumed to be fully 
captured by the control variables; they are subject to endogeneity bias; there is no clear distinction between 
short and long-run dynamics; and nonlinearities are not considered. All these arguments have been 
approached in the literature. The classification of countries and the introduction of interactions is a first 
strategy to deal with problems of heterogeneities and nonlinearities (Brock and Durlauf 2001; Durlauf et al. 
2005). Another strategy is the use of panel data sets and techniques. When panel data sets are considered, 
                                                          
8 Voitchovsky (2005) does find parallel positive and negative effects in a single model by using different parts of the income 
distribution; inequality at the top end of the distribution is positively associated with growth, while inequality lower down the 
distribution is negatively related to subsequent growth. However, the paper acknowledges that its empirical analysis “is not very 
informative regarding the different channels through which inequality might affect income.” 
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the negative effect disappears and even becomes positive once fixed effects or GMM methods are used. 
Nonetheless Partridge (2005) has criticised the use of fixed effects methods for the analysis the relationship 
between inequality and growth, as inequality is a highly persistent variable over time. Similarly, Barro (2000) 
maintains that fixed effects estimates exacerbate the bias due to measurement error. In this paper we have 
taken the above into account integrating into a cross section framework both the positive and negative 
effects of inequality on economic growth focusing on long-run dynamics (as we average growth over 37 
years). In particular, we followed Sala-i-Martin et al.’s (2004) analysis on economic growth using cross-
sectional data.  
We set a neoclassical econometric model of economic growth (equation (1)) where 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is our 
dependent variable, reflecting cumulative annual average GDP growth rate (in per capita terms), 𝐼𝑖0  is 
income inequality, and 𝑋𝑖 is a list of control variables, including the initial income, 𝑦𝑖0: 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖𝚪 + 𝛽𝐼𝑖0 +  𝑢1𝑖   (1) 
 
OLS regressions are likely to underestimate the negative effect of inequality, and this could be 
indeed because of a co-occurring positive effect (Easterly 2007). In fact, reduced form estimations for the 
effect of inequality on growth are likely to pick up different effects at the same time (Bourguignon 1996), 
related to the above-discussed transmission channels. A common strategy in the empirical literature 
reviewed has been the use of intermediate variables as proxies for the channel under analysis. In parallel, 
taking into account endogeneity concerns on the effect of inequality on growth and the existence of two 
differentiated components of inequality, a second approach has been to isolate one of those components 
using specific instruments for inequality. Therefore, both strategies - intermediate variables and instruments 
- rely on the use of alternative information to capture a particular relationship between inequality and long-
run growth. In the first strategy each channel is considered independently and no attempt is made to 
examine all of them in a single growth model. In fact, as we have seen, few papers consider empirically more 
than a single channel. Similarly, in the second strategy, while the negative effect of inequality has been 
identified with exogenous instruments (Easterly 2007), that has not been the case with the positive effect. 
Consequently, the use of alternative information has only been capable to identify the negative impact of 
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inequality on economic growth. This is reasonable indeed as the positive association refers to market 
dynamics intrinsic to the growth process itself, which makes it difficult (if not impossible) to find exogenous 
variables for the identification process.  
Building on both strategies, and assuming the problem of identification for the positive impact of 
inequality on economic growth, our goal is to disentangle, in a single model, the two possible relationships 
between inequality and long-run economic growth. In order to do that, we considered several variables that 
the literature has proposed as associated with the different transmission channels, to capture the negative 
effect of inequality on growth. Once the negative impact of inequality on economic growth was identified, 
we isolated the positive association between the two variables.  
 Hence, following the literature, we considered inequality in equation (1) as endogenous, i.e. 
correlated with the disturbance term, 𝑢1𝑖. One solution for dealing with endogeneity is to apply the so-
called Control Function Approach. Like instrumental variables (2SLS), this procedure uses instruments to 
break the correlation between endogenous explanatory variables and unobservable variables affecting the 
response. In linear models with one endogenous regressor, CFA yields identical results to those obtained 
with 2SLS. CFA yields consistent parameter estimates if instruments are valid (see Imbens and Wooldridge 
2009 and Wooldridge 2010).  
Following Wooldridge's (2010) formalization of the CFA, we considered a list of instruments for 
inequality, 𝑍, that are exogenous in model (1): 
𝐸(𝑍′𝑢1) = 0       (2) 
where 𝑋 in model (1) is a strict subset of 𝑍. As in 2SLS, we considered the reduced form for 
inequality as: 
𝐼 = 𝑍𝚽 + 𝑣2       (3) 
𝐸(𝑍′𝑣2) = 0       (4) 
Since 𝑢1 is uncorrelated with 𝑍, it turns out that 𝐼 is endogenous in (1) if and only if 𝐸(𝑢1𝑣2) ≠ 0. 
The linear projection of 𝑢1 onto 𝑣2 in error form is: 
𝑢1 = 𝜌1𝑣2 + 𝑒1      (5) 
Since both 𝑢1 and 𝑣2 are orthogonal to 𝑍, then 𝐸(𝑍′𝑒1) = 0, and 𝐼 is exogenous if and only if 
𝜌1 = 0. Plugging equation (5) into equation (1) transforms our growth equation into: 
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𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝑐 + 𝑋𝚪 + 𝛽𝐼0 + 𝜌1𝑣2 + 𝑒1    (6) 
where, by construction, 𝑒1 is uncorrelated with 𝑋, 𝐼 and 𝑣2. As we cannot observe 𝑣2, the solution 
under the CFA is to estimate 𝑣2 - the residual from an OLS regression of equation (3). Replacing 𝑣2 with 
𝑣2 in (6) and estimating again by OLS yields consistent estimates for 𝚪, 𝛽and 𝜌1. The parameter 𝜌1 in (6) 
will capture the bias that would affect 𝛽 if we did not control for 𝑣2 , allowing us to see the sign and 
magnitude of that bias. 
Now, if we assume that our instrument set - 𝑍 in equation (2) - is only able to capture a negative 
form of inequality, the remaining unexplained variance of inequality, including its positive form, is captured 
by 𝑣2. In other words, as far as we can capture the negative component of inequality by 𝑍, the remaining 
variance of inequality will most likely be an approximation of its positive component. Consequently, the 
parameter 𝜌1 in an OLS estimation of equation (6), once the original values of 𝐼 and the estimations of 𝑣2, 
namely 𝑣2, are included, can help us to identify the (potential) positive association between inequality and 
long-run economic growth.  
Alternatively, we could consider inequality as 𝐼 = 𝑍𝚷𝟏 + 𝑊𝚷𝟐 + 𝜔2 , where only the negative 
component can be captured with instrumental variables (𝑍), while the positive component can only be 
captured through covariates, 𝑊, that are correlated with 𝑢1. Hence, the residual of the linear projection of 
𝐼 on 𝑍, 𝑣2, would equal 𝑊𝚷𝟐 + 𝜔2, and the linear projection of 𝑢1 onto 𝑣2 in error form would be 𝑢1 =
𝜌1(𝑊𝚷𝟐 + 𝜔2) + 𝑒1. Consequently, the remaining estimated component 𝑣2 in our growth equation would 
include 𝑊𝚷𝟐 plus any unexplained variance, 𝜔2. In this case 𝛽 would consistently estimate the negative 
influence of inequality on economic growth. It can happen, though, that some mechanisms of inequality are 
at the same time related to their positive and to their negative associations with growth, as suggested in the 
literature, and consequently 𝐸(𝑍′𝑊) ≠ 0. In such case, the estimation of 𝚽 in (3) would not equal 𝚷𝟏, 
being the bias linked to 𝐸(𝑍′𝑊). As a consequence our approach would be affected and we could expect a 
bias towards zero of both 𝛽 and 𝜌1 in (6). Subsequently, we understand that the misspecification in (3) 
coming from not considering instruments of the positive channel of inequality, 𝑊, that could be correlated 
with the instruments of negative channels, 𝑍, would be driving our estimates in (6) to be non-significant. 
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Hence, if we find significant results for both 𝛽 and 𝜌1, we will be able to say that they are downward 
bounded.9 
 
4. DATA 
As control variables in our growth model we used log_pcgdp - the initial level of per capita GDP (in log), 
life_exp - the life expectancy at birth, p60 - the primary enrolment rate, yrsopen - the number of years the 
economy has been open between 1950 and 1994, primary_exports - the fraction of primary exports in total 
exports, and mining - the fraction of GDP in mining - to capture natural endowments.10 The data, aside that 
for income inequality, comes from Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), the Penn World Table (PWT), and the World 
Bank Development Indicators database. Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, and we 
relied on Gruen and Klasen (2008).11 A table with the variables used and their sources is annexed as 
Appendix B. We used data as close to 1970 as possible to explain average growth rates between 1970-2007 
in a sample of 51 countries (a list of which is also annexed as Appendix C).12 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the growth equation, while Table 2 
presents correlations among the variables. Growth is positively correlated with initial values of life_exp, p60 
and yrsopen. By contrast, is negatively correlated with initial values of log_pcgdp, primary_exports, mining and 
inequality. In fact, the highest negative correlation (-0.371) is of growth with inequality. Regarding inequality 
and the controls, inequality is positively correlated with mining and primary_exports and negatively correlated 
with all the other variables.  
 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics: variables in growth equation 
   Mean Std. Dev.  Maximum  Minimum 
                                                          
9  The use of residual variation in recursive estimation to disentangle opposing dynamics has already been used in the 
macroeconomics literature. As far as we know, however, it is the first time it has been used for inequality. 
10 Out of 67 possible explanatory variables, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) found 18 that were significantly related to long-run growth 
during 1960-1996. Results suggest that main determinants for growth include initial levels of per capita GDP - the neoclassical idea 
of conditional convergence - and variables for natural resource endowments, physical and human capital accumulation, 
macroeconomic stability. Productive specialization also seems to negatively affect growth, with a negative and significant effect 
found for the fraction of primary exports in total exports. 
11 These coefficients were adjusted from the WIID database for different possible objects of measure and related to households or 
families and for the entire population, allowing us to address concerns about international comparability of inequality data. These 
adjusted coefficients have previously been used by us as well as by other authors (e.g. Atkinson and Brandolini 2010). We relied on 
income, rather than land or wealth, inequality, because it is income distribution that possibly reflects two distinct sources of 
inequality, namely inequality of opportunities and inequality of returns, which influence economic growth in opposite directions 
(Neves and Silva 2013). 
12 The selected countries are those for which reliable data for all the variables used here has been found. The sample includes major 
countries from all world regions. 
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growth 2.222 1.515 -0.903 7.620 
inequality 44.108 9.377 26.400 62.400 
log_pcgdp 8.381 1.010 6.332 9.891 
life_exp 60.206 10.586 40.365 74.649 
p60 0.799 0.237 0.100 1.000 
yrsopen 0.447 0.357 0.000 1.000 
primary_exports 0.104 0.097 0.009 0.555 
mining 0.040 0.047 0.000 0.208 
No. of observations included: 51    
 
 
Table 2. Correlations: variables growth equation 
  growth inequality log_pcgdp life_exp p60 yrsopen primary_exports 
growth 1.000             
inequality -0.371 1.000           
log_pcgdp -0.079 -0.301 1.000         
life_exp 0.302 -0.498 0.854 1.000    
p60 0.375 -0.321 0.703 0.837 1.000   
yrsopen 0.264 -0.337 0.696 0.707 0.629 1.000  
primary_exports -0.345 0.239 -0.177 -0.264 -0.203 -0.120 1.000 
mining -0.199 0.259 -0.253 -0.402 -0.254 -0.228 0.509 
No. of observations included: 51 
 
 
Additionally, we looked for variables related to inequality that we could use to identify each of the 
transmission channels that give rise to an effect on long-run economic growth. As our goal is to use these 
variables to disentangle different dynamics in the relationship between initial inequality and subsequent 
growth, we considered data as close to 1970 as possible (and with controls in the growth equation). To 
capture the institutional mechanism, and following Easterly (2007), we considered geographical variables: 
the exogenous suitability of land for wheat versus sugarcane - as proxy for factor endowment differentials 
across countries - and the proportion of population in tropical areas. We added the proportion of 
mountainous lands, as it seems to have a high and significant explanatory power for inequality, as we discuss 
below. Using geographical variables has the additional econometric advantage of allowing us to capture 
exogenous variation that helps us identify the effect of (structural) inequality.13 For Socio-Political Instability 
(SPI) we considered variables related to social unrest and violence, following Alesina and Perotti (1996). We 
used a parsimonious strategy and selected, among several variables positively correlated with inequality and 
                                                          
13 As in Easterly (2007), the considered geographical determinants appear as highly correlated with institutional variables. However, 
introducing institutional variables directly is challenging given that institutions are expected to be endogenous to economic 
performance.  
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negatively with growth, three variables that yielded the highest R-square in a regression on inequality.14 For 
Domestic Market size and the role of the middle class (DM) we used aggregate GDP and the share of the 
third quintile in the income distribution. Using openness as one of the controls in the growth equation 
already captures the role played by foreign markets in the total market size. For the role of Fertility decisions 
(FER) we considered population growth rates, infant mortality rates, and the proportion of family farms, 
all highly correlated with fertility rates and inequality levels.15 For redistributive policies, as one main focus 
of the Political Economy (PE) approach, we used average government spending and average expenditure 
on education, both as share of GDP. Regarding the Credit Market Imperfections (CMI) approach, we 
considered access to sound money and patents, as proxy for innovation. Table 3 presents descriptive 
statistics for all the different variables considered and their correlation with inequality. 
 
5. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
We implemented our empirical strategy by recursive estimation. Hence, in a first equation we relate income 
inequality to different variables according to transmission channel (as in equation 3). From this first 
estimation we generated for each set of variables, an estimated residual term, 𝑣2, capturing the unexplained 
variance in inequality. The aim here is simply to decompose the variance in inequality. In a second equation, 
and again for each set of variables, we introduced inequality and the estimated residual from the first 
equation, along with control variables, in order to estimate our model of long-run economic growth. By 
introducing both terms, i.e. inequality and the estimated residual, we were able to assess two differentiated 
effects on economic growth. By using different sets of variables, we could analyse which factors needed to 
be controlled for our residual to capture a long-run growth-enhancing component of inequality. This is 
something that is not done in panel data analysis, which suggests a positive effect of inequality on growth.  
 
 Table 3. Descriptive statistics: variables inequality equation 
                                                          
14 We also considered several other variables for social unrest and violence as robustness checks in the estimations described in 
section 4. Aside from social unrest and violence, other authors have considered variables related to liberties, rights and institutions. 
However, data for these variables are only available from the 80s and are expected to by highly affected by economic performance. 
We therefore restricted our analyses to the selected variables, which are some of the most commonly used in the literature and 
helped to reduce endogeneity. 
15 When we regressed inequality on our controls, fertility rates did not add significant explanatory power, and their use as a valid 
instrument for inequality was rejected by the instrument tests implemented. 
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Considered variables Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Corr. with 
Inequality 
Geography-Institutions 
 wheat_sugar 0.079 0.182     -0.393 0.442 -0.625 
 troppop 0.197 0.315 0.000 1.000 0.339 
 mount     17.587     18.651 0.000     73.700 0.412 
Socio-Political Instability (SPI) 
 assassp2 0.005 0.021 0.000 0.138 0.254 
 death     12.102 4.365 5.678     23.500 0.173 
 wardum 0.392 0.493 0.000 1.000 0.265 
Domestic Market 
 Q3     13.979 3.187 7.700     18.720 -0.792 
 logGDP1970     10.470 0.780 8.740     12.573 -0.412 
Fertility 
 pop_growth 1.969 1.068 -0.584 4.458 0.512 
 mortality     76.691     51.507     11.200    193.000 0.460 
Political Economy 
 kg702007 8.593 4.264 2.221 20.918 0.020 
 exp_edu     15.070 4.403 6.187 24.478 0.358 
Credit Market Imperfections (CMI) 
 fi_sm 7.017 1.608 2.518 9.647 -0.029 
 innovation     74.704   124.992 0.000   539.986 -0.492 
 familyf     46.843     25.808 2.000      94.000 -0.435 
              
 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (3), our inequality equation, including controls 
from the growth equation. We report standardized (beta) coefficients and Shea’s Partial R-square to measure 
the relevance of the considered variables excluded from the growth equation. All channels report significant 
parameters. The channel with the highest partial R-square (0.489) corresponds to the geography-institutions 
(column 1). These variables are time-invariant factors that are cancelled out in the panel data analysis with 
fixed effects or first differences. This could explain why a positive effect of inequality is found in this type 
of analysis. The proportion of mountainous land deserves special attention. Although not considered before 
in the literature as an instrument for inequality, it has a high correlation with inequality and remains highly 
significant even when controlling for other proxies for structural inequality. Finally, in column (7) we 
considered all factors associated by the empirical literature with a negative effect of inequality, and 
consequently we excluded the variables associated with the political economy and credit market 
imperfections approaches, which report significant parameters for the positive side of these two channels. 
The exclusion of these variables is reinforced by the performed Hansen tests (as we further explain below). 
All these factors explain about 80 per cent of the variance in inequality.  
 
Table 4: Results for the inequality equation 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
  
Geography-
Institutions 
SPI 
Domestic 
Market 
Fertility 
Political 
Economy 
CMI 
  
wheat_sugar -0.481 ***       -0.124 
troppop 0.123       -0.101 
mount 0.298 ***       0.249 ** 
assassp2  0.187 ***      0.196 *** 
death  -0.956 ***      -0.566 ** 
wardum  0.024      -0.054 
Q3   -0.727 ***     -0.518 *** 
logGDP1970   -0.164     -0.016 
pop_growth    0.400 *    -0.170 
mortality    -0.135    -0.089 
familyf    -0.286 *    -0.038 
kg702007     0.044    
exp_edu     0.345 **    
fi_sm      0.035   
innovation      -0.453***   
R2 0.670 0.612 0.666 0.843 0.447 0.454  0.825 
Shea's Partial 
R2 
0.489 0.399 0.483 0.199 0.143 0.155 
 
0.728 
Notes: First-stage estimations using robust standard errors and small-sample correction. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. OLS coefficients have been standardized to ease comparability. Controls from the growth equation 
(log_pcgdp, life_exp, p60, yrsopen, primary_exports and mining) are also included. Shea's partial R2 measures the 
relevance of the excluded instruments (i.e. those not included in the growth equation). Column 7 excludes 
instruments for PE and CMI channels, rejected by the Hansen test. 
 
 
 Before we assessed two components of inequality in the growth equation, we tested to what extent 
they indeed captured negative and positive dynamics in the growth process, based on the theory revised in 
section II. One simple and straightforward way is to see how the two components correlate with long-run 
growth, as well as with physical and human capital accumulation, innovation and institutional quality. On 
the one hand, our estimated inequality using all factor considered in column 7 of Table 4 has a significant 
negative correlation with growth, -0.462, as well as with the average investment during the whole period 
(ki), -0.247, and with the total average years of schooling in 2005 (schooling), -0.429. The correlation with 
innovation and institutional quality (icrg_qog) are also negative, -0.517 and -0.578, respectively. On the other 
hand, our second component (the remaining variance in inequality) has a positive correlation with growth, 
0.117, as well as with physical capital accumulation, 0.191. Figure 1 plots our two orthogonal components 
and their relationship with long-run growth. Both components have been standardized to split the sample 
of countries in four quadrants. It can be seen that countries with lower estimated negative inequality had 
higher growth rates (represented with larger bubbles in the graph). Furthermore, the highest average growth 
rates were found in the top left quadrant of the figure. In this quadrant we find countries with low estimated 
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negative inequality but a high estimated residual (our positive component); e.g. Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, 
South Korea and the United States. By contrast, the lowest average growth rates were found in countries 
with high estimated negative inequality but a low estimated residual (the bottom right quadrant, including 
mostly Latin American countries like Peru and El Salvador, but also other countries like Zambia and Cote 
d’Ivoire).  
 
Figure 1: Two components of inequality and long-run growth 
 
         Notes: The size of each bubble is proportional to the long-run growth rates for each country.  
        Average growth figures reported represent averages calculated for the countries in each quadrant.  
 
 
Table 5 presents results for the impact of inequality on long-run growth. Column 1 shows the 
results from the OLS estimation of model (1). Columns 2 to 6 present the results from our 2SRI (Two-
Stage Residual Inclusion) estimations, based on the CFA.16 2SRI estimations were done using bootstrap 
standard errors to adjust for the generated regressor bias from the first equation. We report the Kleibergen-
Paap LM test probability to check for under-identification, and the Hansen test probability to check for the 
validity of our approach.17 In each column we introduced as a further control in the growth equation the 
residual from the first set of estimation for inequality (as suggested by the CFA) for each considered channel. 
                                                          
16 See Terza et al. (2008) for a good explanation of 2SRI and the requisites or its consistency.  
17 We tested for the relevance and validity of our approach in different ways. For relevance, we looked at the F statistic and the 
Partial-R-squared of the first regression, and performed under-identification tests. For validity we performed tests of over-
identifying restrictions. 
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Hence, column 2 only considers the geographical variables as instruments for inequality. Finally, column 8 
includes all factors considered in column 7 of Table 4.  
 
Tables 5: Results for the growth equation 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 
  OLS    2SRI  2SRI  2SRI  2SRI  2SRI  2SRI  2SRI  
     
Geography-
Institutions 
Socio-
Political 
Instability 
Domestic 
Market 
Fertility 
Political 
Economy 
Credit Market 
Imperf. 
 
  
Inequality -0.015  -0.044* 0.0001 -0.061** -0.037 -0.015 0.002  -0.038** 
s.e. -0.014  0.026 0.026 0.027 0.040 0.045 0.046  0.019 
Resid   0.057 -0.026 0.089** 0.028 -0.0009 -0.020  0.083** 
s.e.   0.037 0.038 0.037 0.049 0.052 0.046  0.040 
Controls:           
log_pcgdp -1.940***  -1.803*** -2.014*** -1.722*** -1.836*** -1.944*** -2.022***  -1.833*** 
life_exp 0.118***  0.088* 0.134*** 0.070 0.095 0.118** 0.135**  0.094** 
p60 2.091**  2.512** 1.867* 2.756** 2.410** 2.080* 1.844  2.418** 
yrsopen 1.450**  1.374** 1.490** 1.331** 1.393** 1.452** 1.494**  1.391** 
primary_exports  -4.657**  -4.318** -4.834** -4.121** -4.400** -4.666* -4.856**  -4.393** 
mining 4.477  4.061 4.698 3.820 4.162 4.488 4.721  4.154 
Constant 10.077***  11.690*** 9.216*** 12.627*** 11.299*** 10.033*** 9.128**  11.330*** 
           
Observations 51  51 51 51 51 51 51  51 
R squared 0.672  0.692 0.676 0.721 0.675 0.672 0.674  0.706 
K-P p-value   0.001 0.008 0.000 0.028 0.024 0.004  0.028 
Hansen p-value    0.771 0.406 0.364 0.178 0.068 0.039  0.368 
Excluded instruments: 
 
wheat-
sugar, 
troppop 
mount 
death 
assassp2 
wardrum 
 
Q3 
logGDP19
70 
pop_grow
th 
mortality 
familyf 
kg      
exp_edu 
fi_sm 
innovation 
 death 
assassp2 
wardrum 
Q3 
logGDP-
1970, 
pop-
growth, 
mortality 
familyf 
wheat-
sugar, 
troppop 
mount 
Notes: Estimations using bootstrap standard errors (1,000 repetitions). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. K-P is the Kleibergen-
Paap LM statistic, which tests for the null hypothesis that the matrix of the reduced-form coefficients in the first-stage 
regression is under-identified. The Hansen J statistic tests the null hypothesis of instrument validity under the assumption of 
heteroscedasticity. Column 8 excludes instruments for PE and CMI channels, rejected by the Hansen test. 
 
 
All controls have the expected sign in all estimations and their coefficients are all significant (except 
for that of mining). Results are consistent with conditional convergence, with a negative coefficient for 
initial per capita GDP of around 2 per cent - as in Sala-i-Martin 2004 - and higher human capital levels 
increasing long-run growth (i.e. a positive coefficient for life_exp and p60). Openness is also positively 
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associated with growth, while primary sector specialization is negatively so (i.e. a negative coefficient for 
primary_exports).  
For inequality, the OLS estimation yields a negative, although non-significant, coefficient. As 
aforementioned, this could be the result of two significant effects cancelling each other out.18 When we 
further controlled for the two differentiated components, the coefficient for inequality became significant 
in some of the estimations. In particular, the set for geographical determinants of institutions (column 2), 
the sets of variables associated with domestic market (column 4), and all factors associated to a negative 
effect of inequality (column 8) yield in each case a significant and negative coefficient for inequality. In these 
estimations the coefficient for our forecasted residual, which captures the remaining variance in inequality 
not explained by the variables considered, is positive and significant (borderline significant in column 2). As 
we saw above any bias in our procedure for not considering the full set of variables would lower towards 
zero the estimates of both components. Consequently, the results are not only significant, but also 
downward-bounded, reinforcing our intuition. 
These results support previous results of a negative effect of inequality, in particular related to the 
role of the size of the domestic market and the middle class, as to geographical factors defining structural 
inequality and bad institutional frameworks. Furthermore, our results support the idea of two differentiated 
components of inequality, associated with two different-signed effects. Nevertheless, these two parallel 
effects only become evident when the differentiated mechanisms for inequality are appropriately controlled 
for. Regarding the total impact of inequality, the OLS estimation in column 1 yields a net impact of inequality 
of -0.015. By contrast, controlling for two different components of inequality yields a negative effect of -
0.038 and a positive effect of 0.083. However, considering that our negative component of inequality 
captured around 80 per cent of the variance in inequality, with the residual capturing the remaining variance, 
the weighted average of the two can be approximated to -0.017. This is close to the value reported in column 
1 and results in previous studies, and an economically significant effect after considering the wide differences 
in the Gini coefficients among countries. The difference between the country with the highest inequality in 
                                                          
18 We tested for the endogeneity of inequality. While Durbin and DWH tests reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, the 
Wooldridge test, which considers robust standard errors, did not (but with a p-value of 0.12, still close to suggesting endogeneity). 
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1970, Honduras, and the country with the lowest, Hungary, can represent a difference of half a point of 
average annual growth. 
 
Results by level of development 
Is there always a positive effect of inequality on economic growth? According to Galor and Moav (2004), 
as we have seen, the relationship between inequality and growth changes with the stage of development and 
is expected to be positive only in early stages, and non-significant in developed economies.19 However, 
Galor and Moav’s analysis focuses on the role of credit market imperfections. However, we have seen that 
there are other channels at work. Thus, we can still have a positive effect of inequality at early stages of 
development, as suggested by Galor and Moav, but also a negative effect, as suggested by other approaches. 
We performed structural stability tests on our sample by differentiating countries based on whether they 
were OECD members in 1970 or not, as a proxy for stage of development.20 As the tests support the 
possibility of differentiated effects, in Table 6 we let the impact of our two components of inequality to vary 
for countries that were OECD members in 1970 and for countries that were non-members.21 All controls 
remained significant, except that for mining. Additionally, once we controlled for two components of 
inequality, the negative and positive effects of inequality are only significant in developing countries. For 
developed countries the two components still have coefficients with opposing signs, although they are non-
significant (in line with Galor and Moav 2004).22 
 
  
 
 
Table 6: Growth equation, by level of development 
Dependent variable: growth     
 
2SRI  
coef. 
 
s.e. 
INEQUALITY*OECD     -0.0339 0.033 
                                                          
19 Indeed, the previously studied correlations of our two components of inequality with growth and capital accumulation become 
stronger if we consider separately the developing and the developed countries.  
20 In particular, we tested parameter heterogeneity for the coefficients for our two components of inequality based on the OECD-
non-OECD dichotomy.  
21 Thus, we expect to partly control for heterogeneity across countries. 
22 Chambers and Krause (2010) provide evidence of the second phase of Galor and Moav’s (2004) hypothesis; in particular that in 
countries with low educational attainments, the negative effects of inequality increase with higher capital stocks. 
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INEQUALITY*nonOECD     -0.0365* 0.022 
Resid*OECD      0.0598 0.058 
Resid*nonOCDE      0.0898* 0.048 
Controls:   
log_pcgdp  -1.8726*** 0.380 
life_exp    0.0941** 0.046 
p60   2.4309* 1.294 
yrsopen   1.4035** 0.601 
primary_exports      -4.3623** 2.061 
mining       4.1268 4.005 
Constant      11.5439*** 2.577 
      
Observations 51 
R squared 0.707 
Notes: Estimations using bootstrap standard errors (1,000 
repetitions). * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
6. SENSITIVITY AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Because our procedure relies on the selection of variables to identify the transmission channels, a further 
check of our results was to use a different set of variables for each of the channels. For most channels this 
is complicated because of data scarcity. However, the role of the different channels, and in particular the 
existence of a positive and a negative effect of inequality, appeared robust to the selection of variables to 
capture these channels. For instance, to capture the idea of socio-political instability we also tried the 
variables considered by Alesina et al. (1996, political instability dataset), although at the expense of losing 4 
observations due to data availability, and we were still able to find significant coefficients (one positive and 
one negative) for our two components of inequality (see estimation 1 in Table 7). 
 Additionally, we analysed the possibility of direct effects on economic growth that were not 
associated with inequality of some of the channels considered. In particular, the fertility mechanism is 
expected to have a direct and negative effect on long-run growth, associated with family decisions relevant 
for physical and human capital accumulation (Barro 2000), and in fact we discarded fertility rates as violating 
validity tests. We controlled for fertility rates directly in the growth equation (see estimation 2 in Table 7). 
The coefficient for fertility is negative and significant, as expected. However, even after controlling for 
fertility we found two significant effects of inequality on growth. Barro found a non-significant effect for 
inequality after controlling for fertility, but did not consider, as we did, further opposing and significant 
effects of inequality that could be cancelling each other out.  
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As with fertility, we expanded our analysis to the consideration of the direct (disaggregated) role of 
the different transmission channels in the growth equation. We followed Alesina and Perotti (1996) and 
constructed an index as proxy for socio-political instability (SPI index), using the method of principal 
components analysis applied to several variables of social unrest. For the role of the domestic market we 
introduced the initial income (logGDP1970), capturing domestic market size, and to quantify the role of the 
middle class, we included the share of the third quintile in the income distribution (Q3). For redistributive 
policies we introduced the variable share of government consumption over GDP (kg), which captures 
government spending. Finally, we maintained fertility rates as a further control. The estimation 3 of Table 
7 shows how our main result of two opposing effects associated with inequality holds even after the 
inclusion of direct effects on the growth equation. 
 
Table 7: Robustness checks  
Dependent variable: growth        
  2SRI (1) 2SRI (2) 2SRI (3) 
  Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Inequality -0.0373** 0.018 -0.0212* 0.009   
Resid  0.0797** 0.033      0.0727*** 0.015    0.0597* 0.031        
fertility     -0.8818** 0.264 -0.8295*** 0.307 
SPI_index       -0.1488 0.168 
logGDP1970        0.3503 0.248 
Q3        0.0712 0.051 
kg702007       -0.0338 0.040 
Controls:   
   
 
log_pcgdp -1.4518*** 0.251     -1.9032*** 0.366 -2.0890*** 0.329 
life_exp      0.0701* 0.037 0.0400 0.064     0.0451 0.056 
p60 2.1799** 0.829 0.7530 0.412     0.3046 1.202 
yrsopen 1.1894** 0.455 0.8005* 0.360     0.6223 0.501 
primary_exports -3.5561*** 1.212 -0.8232 1.147     0.7057 2.461 
mining     3.6833 3.014 4.4076 2.884     3.1386 2.998 
Constant 9.6529*** 1.852     18.7118*** 2.046 14.8024*** 3.352 
Observations 47 51 51 
R squared 0.619 0.778 0.818 
Notes: Estimations using bootstrap standard errors (1,000 repetitions). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The 
instrument set in estimation 1 replaces assassp2, death and wardum with riotan, scoup, polrig, assass, attack, democy, execute 
and repress (all expressed as yearly averages for the period 1950 to 1982. The instrument set in estimation 2 excludes 
pop_growth, mortality and familif because fertility enters directly as a regressor. 
 
 
 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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We introduce the use of the control function approach (CFA), traditionally used to address endogeneity 
concerns, to analyse the relationship between inequality and economic growth. The CFA has allowed us to 
track different transmission channels of the effects of inequality on long-run economic growth, by using 
alternative sets of variables. By considering the idea of two differentiated components of inequality (WDR 
2006) and different proxies expected to relate to different transmission channels, we have empirically 
distinguished in a single model both negative and positive effects of inequality on long-run growth. Our 
results suggest, in line with the literature, that high inequality has indeed a negative effect on long-run 
growth. This effect seems associated with increasing social unrest and political instability, lower aggregate 
demand for local goods, higher fertility rates, and bad institutional development. However, our results also 
support the possibility of a long-run growth-enhancing component of inequality, and allow us to see the 
relevance of the mechanisms that need to be controlled for that positive effect of inequality to become 
empirically evident.  
Results emphasize the complexity of the relationships between income distribution and economic 
growth. This complexity exists everywhere but is more intense in developing countries. In this manner, what 
is interesting is not whether inequality is harmful or beneficial for growth but rather to attain a satisfactory 
description of the dynamics of the relationship in these countries. In order to assess the impact of inequality 
on economic growth in a given country, one should focus on the dynamics of inequality. When inequality 
is associated with political instability and social unrest, rent-seeking and distortive policies, lower capacities 
for investments in human capital and a stagnant domestic market, it is mostly expected to harm long-run 
economic performance, as suggested by many authors. Accordingly, improving income distribution is 
expected to foster long-run economic growth, especially in low-income countries, where the levels of 
inequality are usually very high. However, some degree of inequality can also be good, as has been 
theoretically argued before in the literature and as empirically suggested in this study. A degree of inequality, 
when driven by market forces and related to hard work and growth-enhancing incentives, like risk taking, 
innovation, capital investments and agglomeration economies, can play a beneficial role for economic 
growth. The challenge for policy makers is to control structural inequality that reduces the country’s 
capacities for economic development, while at the same time keeping in place those positive incentives that 
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are also necessary for growth. To ease this task, a broader and deeper understanding of the dynamics behind 
the relationship between inequality and economic development will prove to be invaluable.     
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APPENDIX A: Empirical Evidence on the channels: channels considered, variables used and main result 
  Socio-Political Instability Political Economy CMI Domestic Market Fertility 
Geography- 
Institutions Effect on growth or inv. 
Persson&Tabellini (94)   1     1) Non-significant 
   Welfare transfers      
Alesina&Perotti (96) 1      1) Negative 
 Number of assassinations       
 Number of violent deaths       
 Number of successful coups       
 Number of unsuccessful coups       
  Dummy for democracy        
Perotti (94) 1 2 3    1) Negative; 2) Non-sig.; 
 Number of assassinations Marginal tax rate Loan-to-value  
payments 
   3) Negative 
 Number of violent deaths Welfare expenditures     
 Number of successful coups       
 Number of unsuccessful coups       
 Dummy for democracy       
Falkinger& 
Zweimüller (97)      
1 
Index of product diversity  
 
1) Non-significant 
          
Svensson (98) 1      1) Negative 
 Quality of property rights       
        
Keefer&Knack (2002) 1   2   1) Negative; 
 Quality of property rights   Population   2) Non-significant 
    Aggregate GDP    
     Openness     
Barro (2000)      1  1) Negative 
       Fertility rates    
Easterly (2007)      1 1) Negative 
      
Wheat-to-sugar 
Tropopop  
 APPENDIX B: Variables used: 
Growth model Description Source 
growth Cumulative annual average per capita GDP growth rate 
Constructed with data from PWT (Heston et al. 2012), using 
real GDP chain data (rgdpch) 
inequality Gini coefficient. 1970 Gruen and Klasen (2008) 
log_pcgdp Per capita GDP (in logs) 
Constructed with data from PWT (Heston et al. 2012), using 
real GDP chain data (rgdpch) 
life_exp Life Expectancy at birth, total years. 1970 World Bank 
p60 Primary enrolment rate. 1960 Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). From Barro and Lee (1993) 
yrsopen 
Number of years the economy has been open                     
between 1950 and 1994. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). From Sachs and Warner (1995) 
primary_exports Fraction of primary exports in total exports. 1970 Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). From Sachs and Warner (1997) 
mining Fraction of GDP in mining. 1970 Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). From Hall and Jones (1999) 
Inequality Model     
assassp2 Number of political assassinations. Sala-i-Martin (2004). From Barro and Lee (1993) 
death 
Crude death rate per 1000 people.                                              
Average between 1960 and 1990 
Constructed using 1960 (or earlier available value) to 1990. 
World Bank 
wardum 
Dummy for countries that have been involved in a war any 
time between 1960 and 1990. 
Sala-i-Martin (2004). From Barro and Lee (1993) 
kg702007 
Share of government consumption to real GDP.                                  
Average between 1970 and 2007 PWT. (Heston et al.) 
exp_edu Expenditure in education. World Bank 
fi_sm Access to sound money. PRS Group (2012), International Country Risk Guide  
innovation Patents per million inhabitants. Closest value to 1970  World Bank 
Q3 
Share of the third quintile in the income distribution.  From WIDER dataset (cross section constructed taking data 
for each country in the closest available year to 1970) 
logGDP1970 GDP (in log). 1970 PWT. (Heston et al.) 
pop_growth Population growth rate. 1970 World Bank 
mortality Infant mortality rate, per 1000 live births. 1969   World Bank* 
familyf Family farms. As percentage of total cultivated area. Vanhanen's indicators of power resource distribution 
wheat_sugar 
Proportion of land suitable to wheat compared to land 
suitable to sugar (in logs).  Easterly (2007) 
troppop Proportion of population living in tropical areas.  Easterly (2007) 
mount Proportion of mountainous land. Collier (2009) 
Others     
ki 
Share of investment to real GDP.                                        
Average between 1970 and 2007 PWT. (Heston et al.) 
fertility Fertility rate, 1970. World Bank 
schooling2005 Mean years of schooling, age 15+, total. 2005     World Bank** 
icrg_qog_1984  Quality of Government Index. 1984 PRS Group (2012), International Country Risk Guide  
riotan Number of riots. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
scoup Number of successful coups. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
polrig Measure of political rights. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
assass Number of assassinations per million population per year. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
attack Number of armed attacks per year. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
democy Index of democracy. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
execute Number of political executions per year. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
repres Number of repressions per year. Alesina et al. (1996) dataset 
Notes: * Missing value for Hong Kong filled with those of China. ** Missing values for MDG and NGA filled using International Institute for 
Applied System Analysis and the Vienna Institute of Demography (IIASA/VID) projections.  
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APPENDIX C: List of countries: 
 
Country isocode Country isocode Country isocode 
Australia AUS Honduras HND Norway NOR 
Bangladesh BGD Hong Kong HKG Pakistan PAK 
Belgium BEL Hungary HUN Panama PAN 
Bolivia BOL India IND Peru PER 
Brazil BRA Indonesia IDN Philippines PHL 
Canada CAN Ireland IRL Portugal PRT 
China  CHN Italy ITA South Africa ZAF 
Colombia COL Jamaica JAM Spain ESP 
Costa Rica CRI Korea, Republic of KOR Sri Lanka LKA 
Cote d`Ivoire CIV Madagascar MDG Sweden SWE 
Denmark DNK Malawi MWI Tanzania TZA 
Ecuador ECU Malaysia MYS Thailand THA 
Egypt EGY Mexico MEX Tunisia TUN 
El Salvador SLV Morocco MAR Turkey TUR 
Finland FIN Nepal NPL United Kingdom GBR 
France FRA Netherlands NLD United States USA 
Greece GRC Nigeria NGA Zambia ZMB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
